Chinese workers in Algeria fell from 91,000 to 7,000, and the projects kept coming
The model in North Africa has shifted from imported labour to local employment at 70–90%, from resource-backed loans to concessional finance, and from highways to ports, data centres and solar.
The standard picture of Chinese infrastructure in Africa — Chinese money, Chinese workers, resource-backed repayment — is roughly a decade out of date in North Africa. One statistic captures the change: Chinese workers in Algeria fell from 91,000 in 2016 to around 7,000 in 2022, while project activity continued.
What has been built
Morocco. China Railway No. 4 Engineering Group and China Overseas Engineering Corporation hold contracts on segments of the 400km Kenitra-Marrakech high-speed rail line. COVEC's $135 million bid for the Casablanca section beat French competitors — worth noting, since it was won on price and technical scoring in open competition.
Algeria. CITIC Construction completed the final 84km of the East-West Highway in 2023, connecting 17 provinces and improving trade with Tunisia. The project included training thousands of Algerian technicians.
Libya. China Railway Construction Corporation won a 2008 contract for 352km of coastal railway from Khoms to Sirt, plus 172km from Tripoli to the Tunisian border. Work stalled after 2011. Recent talks between Libya, Algeria and Tunisia aim to revive cross-border rail, with Chinese involvement in new phases unclear.
Tunisia. No major transnational rail or road projects, but the Kairouan 100 MW solar plant — North Africa's largest — is under Chinese construction.
The mix has shifted toward ports, digital and energy
Ports. Tangier Med handled 10.24 million TEU in 2024 on $1.2 billion of revenue, with Chinese firms expanding capacity around automation and green energy.
Digital. ZTE is working with Ooredoo in Algeria on 2G/4G modernisation and 5G preparation, while Huawei builds a national data centre. Tunisia signed an ICT cooperation MoU in 2023 covering 5G and cybersecurity, without major operational projects yet.
Energy. Gotion High-Tech is investing in Moroccan EV battery manufacturing. Tunisia's Kairouan solar plant and further solar and wind participation align with its 2050 green hydrogen ambitions.
Finance. China pledged $51 billion to Africa in 2024, including 30 clean energy projects.
Highways and railways to ports, data centres and solar is a meaningful shift. The later categories carry longer operational relationships and more embedded technology than a road does.
Who does the work, and who gets paid
Employment. Chinese firms now employ local workers in 70–90% of roles. Managerial positions are frequently held by Chinese nationals, and specialised roles typically start Chinese with gradual local substitution. Comparable projects elsewhere run similar ratios — Ethiopia's Adama wind farms at 80–85% local.
Technology transfer. Real but modest. Algeria's highway project included engineer training; Morocco's battery plant is intended to build local EV expertise.
Economic effect. Tangier Med has materially improved Moroccan export capacity in automotive and agri-food, contributing to a 12.3% revenue increase in 2024.
Operational control. China typically retains technical oversight through long-term maintenance contracts — CRCC's Moroccan rail involvement includes rolling stock supply and maintenance expertise — while local governments retain ownership. Equity stakes appear in port operations, generally as minority positions, with revenue tied to service contracts rather than ownership.
Ownership stays local, capability stays Chinese, and the maintenance contract is where the durable relationship lives.
Resource-backed versus concessional
The distinction runs along economic structure rather than politics.
Algeria and Libya, both hydrocarbon-rich, use energy exports to secure loans. Repayment runs through sovereign guarantees or export revenue, with amortisation redirecting revenue to Chinese creditors. Algeria's Sonatrach works with Libya's NOC on the Ghadames Basin, with possible Chinese involvement downstream.
Morocco and Tunisia, with diversified economies, take concessional loans for Belt and Road-aligned projects — ports and renewables — rather than resource-backed deals.
Resource-backed lending mitigates Chinese financial risk in less stable markets. Diversified economies can borrow on better terms. The instrument follows the balance sheet.
What this means if you are on the European side
European firms are losing these contracts on price and technical score in open tenders. COVEC beating French competitors on the Casablanca section was a procurement outcome, not a political one. Treating Chinese infrastructure wins in North Africa as geopolitics rather than competitiveness leads to the wrong response.
The localisation shift removes the strongest criticism. A model employing 70–90% local staff with training programmes attached is considerably harder to argue against than one importing labour. European firms competing on local content no longer have a differentiator there.
Digital infrastructure is where the long-term positioning is happening. A national data centre and 5G modernisation create vendor relationships, standards alignment and data governance arrangements lasting decades. That is a quieter contest than ports, and a more consequential one for European technology firms.
Morocco is where the two threads meet. Tangier Med, the high-speed rail, battery manufacturing and the Tanger Tech industrial zone together amount to an integrated position in the country closest to Europe. It is worth assessing as a whole rather than project by project.